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 The creation of sustained change and innovation in large ‘old’ organizations is a 
challenge for innovators and we contend, not well supported by rather static models for
innovator–actor interactions in handbooks.
 This paper proposes a dynamic trust-related approach of innovator–actor interactions,
based on literature and the findings of a case study of innovation processes in a Dutch
multinational.
 The paper concludes that effectiveness can be enhanced if innovators understand the
dynamics of the field and their development over time and focus on the risks the actors
perceive, which shape their areas of relevance.
 If innovators create a situation in which mutual risks are curbed, mutual learning is
promoted and value-congruence becomes possible and can be the basis for a well-
monitored process of trust-based cooperation.
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Innovation processes in
old organizations tend to
be polarization-prone
characteristics of the field as well as lateral
relations between actors into account in the
analysis of trust-related behavioural dynamics.
An innovation process in an old, very suc-
cessful enterprise serves to illustrate insights
that can be gained by this approach.
Models for 
innovator–actor interactions
Innovation processes in large, old and suc-
cessful organizations are often very polarized,
the innovation is often challenged and success
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Introduction
Innovation processes in old organizations tend
to be polarization-prone. Innovation managers
are tempted to accept this polarization and
use an ‘us–them’ scheme and a related power
oriented strategy. Handbooks of innova-
tion management offer more sophisticated
schemes to support managers in action, like
the often-used practice guide of Peter Block
(1990). Block proposes a two-dimensional
analysis of the playing field: the level of agree-
ment on the innovation and the level of trust
between the innovator and the other players.
In this paper we propose a more dynamic and
a more encompassing approach by taking the 
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is not guaranteed (Oosterhaven, 2000). Differ-
entiation into mature subcultures (Schein,
1989) and structural inertia, e.g. over-
attachment to procedures that were effective
in the past but have grown obsolete (Hannan
and Freeman, 1984) may interact to explain
vested interests reigning organizational
processes. According to de Geus (1997) one is
tolerant towards innovations, as long as these
stay at the periphery and do not harm vested
interests. This is congruent with a teaching of
Machiavelli (1513; 1992 VI: 13): ‘he who inno-
vates will have for his enemies all those who
are well off under the existing order of things
and only lukewarm supporters in those who
might be better of under the new’. As soon as
the innovation is more focused on changing
vested practices, interests and coalitions,
tolerance turns into concealed or even open
aversion. Cooperation with the innovator will
be scarce, because as Machiavelli continues
his argument: ‘players fear . . . their adver-
saries . . . and have no faith in anything 
new that is not the result of well-established
experience’.
In such contexts innovators, e.g. innovation
managers, are tempted to approach the field
and its players with an ‘us–them’ or ‘ally–
adversary’ scheme. Such models often advo-
cate the use of a power-oriented strategy like
hierarchic pressure, extra control, coercion or
personal threat to break resistance. One can
wonder if such simple binary models are effec-
tive. From Machiavelli we learn that even to
rely on supporters is risky, because they are
never fully sure whether they will profit from
the change or will be harmed. In short, the ‘us’
in an ‘us–them’ is not a homogeneous and
stable category. Therefore models that allow
more diagnostic differentiation and related
implications for innovators’ action seem more
promising.
Rogers (1995) differentiates the scheme
‘us–them’ into five adopter categories: inno-
vators, early adopters, early majority, late
majority and laggards, thus recognizing that
the way in which actors come to agree with
the innovation may differ between actors.This
categorization might facilitate the innovator to
differentiate his actions towards the various
categories. Block (1990) takes a further step
by adding the degree of trust between inno-
vator and actors as a second analytical dimen-
sion besides the level of agreement.These two
dimensions allow him to identify five different
positions in the playing field: allies, oppo-
nents, bedfellows, fence sitters and real adver-
saries, and to propose which actions an
innovator can take to deal with other actors
and in some cases improve his support. The
most promising category in Bloc’s view is
allies, a category of actors the innovator can
build on and cooperate with during the
process. Block advises taking action to stabi-
lize the trust and the agreement.The next best
category is opponents, high trust but low
agreement. Here Block advises reaffirming the
quality of the relationship, the fact that it is
based on trust, and then discussion of posi-
tions and perhaps engagement in some
problem-solving to create results and try to
persuade them to join the ally category. In
contrast to both of these more stable, high-
trust categories, actors in two low-trust cate-
gories (bedfellows and fence sitters) can be
expected to change their point of view if the
cost–reward balance changes. Real adver-
saries is the most difficult category, because
here trust in the innovator and agreement with
the innovation are lacking, two factors that
can be expected to interact to create a nega-
tively laden mental account of the situation.
Both the approach of Rogers and of Block
provide a more elaborate view of the playing
field and allow variety in the behavioural
repertoire of the innovator towards actors.
However, both models seem rather innovator-
centred. They only raise the issue of whether
actors agree with the goals of the innovator,
or whether they trust him or her at a certain
moment. The goals of the actors, their views
and motives, and how these develop seem to
be ignored, as are other factors besides actions
of the innovator that influence trust or distrust
towards the innovator. Both models appear
not to take account of the dynamics and 
developments that underlie the position of
actors towards both the innovation and the
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innovator. As a consequence, the innovator
may be steered towards recipe-based and
rather inflexible behaviours towards the actors
in the field.
A contextual approach: from 
static models to analysis of 
trust-related dynamics
The level of agreement and the level of 
trust are crucial dimensions in innovation
processes. We propose, however, a more 
contextual approach. Cooperation with the
innovator requires extra-role behaviour and
risk-taking by the players in the field, both of
which are promoted by a trustful relation with
the innovator.The players may be seen as intu-
itive auditors (Kramer, 1996) who sharply
envision the risks involved in cooperation.
Risk perceptions are intensified under condi-
tions of change. Even actors who are willing
to cooperate do not know beforehand if they
will profit from the change or will be harmed.
Why then is trust expected to promote risk-
taking and cooperative behaviours? Most
authors agree that the notion of risk is central
to the concept of trust. According to Luhmann
(1988), trust is a solution for specific problems
of risk in relations between actors, because it
is an attitude that allows for risk-taking. If
actors choose one course of action in prefer-
ence to alternatives, in spite of the possibility
of being disappointed by the action of others,
they define the situation as one of trust
(Luhmann, 1988). Gambetta (1988: 217–218)
links trust and cooperation more explicitly:
‘When we say we trust someone or that
someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean
that the probability that he will perform an
action that is beneficial or at least not detri-
mental to us is high enough for us to con-
sider engaging in some form of cooperation
with him.’
There is more agreement about the conse-
quences of trust than about antecedents. It is
widely acknowledged that trust works as a
lubricant in economic transactions by smooth-
ing relations between actors and reduc-
ing transaction costs related to control 
Trust works as a lubricant
in economic transactions
(Williamson, 1975; Powell, 1990; Creed and
Miles, 1996). A wide array of consequences
have been proposed and found, including:
acceptance of influence (Blau, 1964; Tyler and
Degoey, 1996), belief of information, organi-
zational commitment, decision commitment,
organizational citizenship behaviour, job satis-
faction, satisfaction with leaders (Dirks and
Ferrin, 2002), mutual learning (Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995; Boisot, 1995; Bijlsma-
Frankema et al., 1999; Janowicz and 
Noorderhaven, 2002), attribution of positive
motives (Kramer, 1996), intention to stay, and
positive outcomes such as high levels of co-
operation and performance (Morgan and
Hunt, 1994; Costa et al., 2001; Costa, 2000).
Research on antecedents of trust has not as
yet yielded clear and unambiguous results.
This may be due to context-boundedness. The
behavioural cues actors concentrate on in
pondering trust in another actor may vary
across situations and kinds of relations and be
dependent on the nature of the risks involved.
Trust is influenced by past experiences and
chances of future interactions. Expectations of
others’ beneficial actions will be enhanced by
prior experiences of such behaviour. If others
live up to prior expectations, this good repute
will further positive expectations in the
future, enhance the level of trust and promote
actor’s willingness to cooperate (Lewicki and
Bunker, 1996; Buskens, 1999; Gautschi, 2002).
Trust-related processes thus ask for a dynamic
model to be properly understood.The work of
March and Olsen (1975) and Sitkin and Stickel
(1996) proposes a cyclical model to this effect.
March and Olsen related trust to social inte-
gration in a dynamic view on how trust and
distrust develop. Unlike most authors on trust,
they include the notion of relevance, which is
also found in the work of Weick (1995) on
sense-making in organizations.They argue that
people come to trust those who are perceived
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to bring about desirable events, or to prevent
undesirable events, in areas that are experi-
enced as relevant. If people trust others, they
seek interaction with them, tend to like what
they like and see what they see, to share def-
initions of relevance, thus furthering integra-
tion between them. Distrust creates discord,
since, if others are distrusted, actors will tend
to dislike what they like, tend not to share
their definitions of relevance and, to the
degree that the opportunity structure permits
them, tend to avoid interaction with them. In
the process of developing trust or distrust,
beneficial events will tend to be attributed to
trusted others, detrimental events to those
who are distrusted. Put shortly, trust begets
trust, while distrust begets distrust. Sitkin and
Stickel (1996) made a similar point in con-
cluding that distrust, based on feelings of
value-incongruity, creates barriers that can
stimulate an escalating spiral of formality and
distance between parties.
Working upon these ideas, it can be
assumed that in the process of building trust
in innovators, actors’ areas of relevance play
an important part in selecting behaviours of
innovators that are used as cues in pondering
on trust in the innovator. Since trust is a solu-
tion for problems of risk, it can be conjectured
that trust-related areas of relevance are con-
nected to risks experienced in the relationship
with the innovator. So if innovators’ behav-
iours are experienced as curbing (or at least
not enhancing) these key risks the local man-
agers envision, these behaviours will promote
trust in innovators. Since sense-making
(Weick, 1995) is central to the phenomenon
of trust, mental accounts of actors are a most
important source of information. Kramer
(1996) argues that there is a pressing need for
more ‘naive theories’about trust that are based
on mental accounts of actors studied. Naive
theories being those that ‘individuals, con-
ceptualised as lay epistemologists, carry
around inside their heads. . . . As such, naive
theories presumably play a central role in
their attempts to retrospectively make sense
of and learn from their experiences’ (Kramer,
1996: 238). Kramer further argues that 
contrary to current practices, the analysis of
trust-related mental accounts should include
the specific organizational context, the field in
which they are embedded. This also implies a
focus on lateral relations in addition to the ver-
tical relation between the players in the field
and the innovator.
Taken together, it is conjectured that mental
accounts of actors and their embeddedness in
context and prior experiences in the field of
innovation can contribute to a more dynamic
understanding of innovation processes. An
intriguing question that can be asked within
this analytical framework is how prior rela-
tions and past experiences mould the mental
accounts within the field, especially when a
switch between trustful and distrustful
accounting is made. Switching may be a
matter of reaching a tipping point, as 
Baumeister and Newman (in Kramer, 1996:
236) seem to imply: ‘Meaning is a matter of
associations — of connecting things up in
broad patterns. If the only broad pattern is
happy and optimistic, then isolated contra-
dictory events can be dismissed as minor
problems and annoyances. Each problem
seems minor and trivial in comparison with
the totality of positive aspects. The crucial
step occurs, however, when these contradic-
tory events link together to form a larger
pattern of negative, dissonant thought.’ If a
dissonant pattern has developed, a concentra-
tion of negative valuations of events can be
expected during innovation processes.
The case study
The COOR Group is a successful Dutch co-
operative, multinational, multi-firm, service
organization in the financial sector. It has
approximately 55000 employees and 9 million
customers. COOR is very successful. In 2004
the core of the group consisted of 328
autonomous local cooperative enterprises in
The Netherlands. Many of these enterprises
have a long history; they exist over one
hundred years and are closely tied to the local
societies. They provide services to agricultural
business, retail businesses and SMEs, and sell
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insurances and other financial products. In the
group a number of subsidiaries deliver prod-
ucts to the local cooperative enterprises, but
these subsidiaries also have their own direct
clients. COOR has a national body that is
owned by the 328 local organizations and con-
sists of the Executive Board, ‘Support Local
Organizations’ (SLO) and ICT and Facilities
(ICT). The Executive Board reports to a body
that consists of representatives of the 328 local
enterprises, a kind of parliament that controls
the Executive Board (Figure 1).
The SLO staff for new product development
(NPD) continuously make new product for-
mulas for use in the local enterprises and orga-
nize this kind of work in developmental
‘programmes’. Local enterprises can decide
whether or not they will participate in such a
programme. Participation depends on the
expected value added to the performance of
the local enterprise. Participation of local
enterprises to SLO programmes was observed
to be at a low level sometimes and rather
opportunistic in nature. This seemed in
discord with the formal position of SLO as a
support organization for the local enterprises
which acts to support local members. The
Central COOR also controls the local enter-
prises on financial performance and viability,
on the basis of a supervisory mandate granted
by the Dutch authorities which supervises 
all financial services in The Netherlands.
Interviewees typify COOR as an organization
with a strong culture and organizational 
identity. Some say that ‘to participate in a co-
operative organization is a way of living’. They
are proud of the history of COOR, which is
strongly linked to themes like sustainability
and emancipation of local members of the
cooperative enterprises.
e-Innovation within COOR
Some managers of local COOR enterprises
asked the Executive Board to enhance innov-
ative e-Commerce practices and a better uti-
lization of Internet technology. The Executive
Board assigned an internal innovation team,
positioned as a special staff unit of the Execu-
tive Board, led by an external internet ‘guru’.
Their directive was: be quick, the local man-
agers are waiting. The team was not located
within SLO because their tempo of innovation
was considered by the CEO to be too slow.
The team proposed developing COOR into an
e-Company, through a large investment in pro-
grammes that create external and internal
web-portals, improve customer relations man-
agement practices, procurement programmes,
the use of mobile technology, etc.
The focus of this study is on the Customer
Relationship Management Programme. This
programme aimed to improve the relationship
of employees in local enterprises with their
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customers, to help them to deliver tailor-made
services, to increase the turnover of the local
company and to increase the added value for
customer/members. As a first step this pro-
gramme supported change processes in four
local pilots (2002), in a next step eleven other
local enterprises are meant to be involved
(2003) and from 2004 onwards all other local
enterprises would follow.The innovation team
cooperated closely with local actors. In and
around the local enterprises the team encoun-
tered problems like a strong polarization
between the local enterprises and SLO, and
low participation in SLO programmes. The
team was unsure how to deal with this and
feared that improper actions would damage
the innovative opportunities and create a low
return on the large investment. To prevent
this, the team invested in research on the
dynamics of the field, as a base for the design
of appropriate innovators’ actions.
Research and methodology
In 2001–2003 a team, experienced in natural-
istic inquiry (Erlandson et al., 1993; Guba and
Lincoln, 1989) investigated the dynamics
within COOR. One of the research questions
the team concentrated on was: ‘How can
decreasing participation in innovation pro-
grams be understood?’ Various sources of
information were used: observations during
meetings, awareness conferences and work-
shops for senior management. Loosely struc-
tured interviews were conducted at the start
and end of the pilots (in 2001 and 2003). The
interviewees participating in the innovation
team were managers of the local pilot organi-
zations and/or managers of local COOR enter-
prises that did not participate in the CRM
programme. After 28 interviews the criterion
of saturation was met and no further informa-
tion was found. The interviews were topic-
guided in nature, in analogy with the
interview methodology of Kvale (1996). The
kernel of this method is to ‘pose short ques-
tions and get long answers’, to get as close to
the concepts, meanings and relations between
phenomena that respondents use to make
sense of their experiences and subsequently,
to build opinions on. The topics were: the
local and national context of the innovation
processes, participation-related considerations
and actions, relations with other actors, and
patterns that stimulate or hinder innovation.
All local managers explained their business
extensively, their ambitions and strategies to
improve their performance and why they did
or did not participate in the e-Commerce
pilots. The topics brought up were reflected
upon in an open mode.
The information gathered was structured by
employing causal loop modelling (Vennix,
1996), a technique similar to cause mapping
(Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 1999). The maps that
were constructed represent the causal belief
dimensions in the actor’s thinking on the
context, prior history, on lateral and vertical
relations between the various actors and on
the patterns of behaviours of the actors. In a
couple of feedback sessions and five inter-
views these maps were ‘tested’ for robustness,
an approach also common in naturalistic
inquiry (member check).
Results: the innovation field, a
reflection of prior experiences
How can decreased participation in innova-
tion programmes, especially the CRM pro-
gramme, be explained? As was argued above,
including the context, e.g. the innovation field
in which these behavioural patterns are
embedded, in the analysis can add consider-
ably to our understanding. Characteristics of
the innovation field can also be seen as a
reflection of prior relations and past experi-
ences. Throughout the interviews, several
characteristics of the innovation field, as expe-
rienced by organizational members involved,
came to the fore. The first characteristic was
that two parties could be distinguished within
the field who did not share their mental
accounts of the nature of the relations
between them. SLO representatives thought in
terms of products, marketing and pro-
grammes, many local managers thought in
terms of client relationships and helping
Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, March–April 2005
clients to achieve their ambitions in the local
community. SLO members described the rela-
tionship as: ‘We are headquarters, they are
branches, we lead and control them’, while
local managers said:‘We are independent com-
panies, certainly not a branch or a lower tier
in a hierarchy, they have to serve and
support us.’ SLO experts considered them-
selves as leading in product development;
local managers considered themselves as
entrepreneurs who created value in their busi-
ness services relations with customers, and
also developed innovative business proposi-
tions. Since the innovators are normally based
in SLO, the basic nature of the relationship
experienced between innovator and local
managers is them and us, a pair of terms that
easily gets laden with negative emotions. One
of our interviewees (a local manager) said:
‘Local managers are like donkeys, when 
SLO wants us to go forwards, we all go 
backwards.’
The second characteristic was that the
power-dependence relation between SLO and
the local enterprises was experienced as
unbalanced by the local managers: SLO is an
expert organization and has large amounts of
resources; local managers run their own busi-
ness, have less resources and have to pay
increasing amounts of money as contributions
to SLO whose support is often not evaluated
positively. A third characteristic of the field
was the centrality of three interrelated 
concepts within the mental accounts, e.g.
profitability, reputation and participation in
innovation programmes. This seemed a reflec-
tion of the core issue of this financial organi-
zation, which is profitability. Perceived risks
and reputational or career concerns were
closely bound to the matter of financial
success. Participation of local managers in 
the innovation programmes, which, formally
speaking, was voluntary in nature, was a
related issue. The innovation manager was
dependent on the cooperation of local man-
agers to be able to perform his task, to create
the successful programme that served his rep-
utation. In addition, a certain level of partici-
pation in a programme was often needed to
get the economic scale on which profitability
was based. Profitability was, however, more
important than the number of participants.
For instance, a programme with 50 participat-
ing local enterprises was not continued
because the profitability was too low.
The local managers weighted the costs, in
terms of investing time and estimating the dis-
ruptions of ongoing business, and expected
profits of participation for their own company
when deciding whether to participate or not,
but personal costs were considered as well.
Taking all factors into account, participation
seemed to have become a matter of ‘damn if
you do and damn if you don’t’. If the pro-
gramme turned out to be unprofitable, partic-
ipation meant running the risk of reputation
damage and increased control of the local
enterprise by headquarters. Not participating,
however, could have a negative effect on the
reputation of cooperativeness of the local
manager, which is a critical factor for a suc-
cessful career within COOR as a whole. One
of the interviewees said: ‘When you do not
participate, one sees you as the big-mouth.
Later you pay the bill for that.’ Investments or
participation that turns out to be unprofitable
seem the central risk in this organization that
everyone tries hard to avoid or to curb. A 
practice utilized by all parties involved was
management of ones reputation by telling
stories about results that are more positive
than reality warrants.
A fourth characteristic of the field was a
rather sharp division made by local managers
between formal relations, the front stage, and
informal relations with other local managers,
the back stage scene. Because of reputation
management by innovators and peers, the
front stage did not provide reliable informa-
tion related to the central risk of unprofitable
investments. The back stage was a network of
peers in which information about disappoint-
ing results flowed quickly, enabling local man-
agers to keep track of developments in the
profitability of programmes that peers were
already participating in. This information influ-
enced their decision to participate. If prof-
itability of participation in a given programme
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was low, the reputation costs of non-
participation were lower than if profitability
was high. It can be conjectured that if a 
certain tipping point in profitability had been
reached, the decision to participate would
follow more quickly.
A fifth observation was that local managers
experienced a very high number of requests
to participate but they value focus and in fact
have decreased their level of participation.
One interviewee stated that participation in 
all SLO programmes would require an extra
investment in management effort. Conse-
quently, he decided to participate in only
those programmes that directly contributed to
his five main business goals. The decreasing
level of participation seemed in turn to trigger
SLO permanently to increase the amount of
new programmes and products. Innovation
managers focused on their own programme
and did not manage the interrelations between
programmes nor analyse the absorptive capac-
ity of the local organizations. Some local man-
agers reported that since they wanted to be
seen as loyal, they sometimes decided to 
participate in those programmes that they
considered to be the least harmful for their
local business.
Sixth, harmful behaviour in prior relations
and unpleasant past experience were reflected
in the mental accounts found. Notions of dis-
trust and signs of hyper-vigilance dominated
over notions of trust and successful coopera-
tion between parties. Based on experience in
the past, the local managers mentioned several
success factors of innovation processes: clear
and unambiguous goals, a clear relation to
their business goals, fast feedback loops and
corrective actions and quick results. Their rec-
ollections, however, were mainly of processes
in which these factors were missing.They indi-
cated that often the SLO programmes did not
match with their own business priorities and
complained about the lack of clear positive
results of SLO programmes, about the quality
of the SLO concepts and the SLO support.
Cooperation with SLO did not guarantee them
quick results and as a result their inclination
to participate was low.
Dynamics of participation
Now that the field is typified, the focus is
shifted to behavioural patterns that interact in
a dynamic mode. The next section describes
seven subpatterns or loops separately, and
then discusses the overall pattern. In the
description the letter ‘R’ represents a self-
reinforcing loop. The letter ‘B’ represents a
balancing loop: the effects are dimmed. ‘+’
means: a change in a factor influences the next
factor in the same direction. ‘-’ means: a
change in a factor has an inverse influence on
the next factor. A clock in the figures means:
the effect is delayed.
At the start of a programme a national pro-
gramme manager of COOR-SLO — here
referred to as innovator — developed promo-
tional actions towards local organizations. He
wanted to recruit participants among the man-
agers in the local organizations who did not,
as yet, participate. These promotion activities
might include: presentations, speeches, dis-
cussions with a manager of a local organiza-
tion, letters, articles in COOR mail, etc. They
must gain local managers’ trust so that they
will believe the innovator’s message that the
programme will contribute positively to their
business priorities. When the number of par-
ticipants lags behind the target, the promo-
tional activities are intensified. When the
target was almost reached, the promotion
actions finished. This loop (see Figure 2) was
called Growing number of participants
through promotion (Loop B1). B1 behaves as
a balancing loop. The participation grew
faster if the programme contributed to local
business priorities and the Executive Board of
COOR paid attention to it. These conditions
enabled ‘selling’ the programme.
Loop B1 was dependent on local managers’
trust in the innovator to work effectively.Trust
in the innovator led to belief in the informa-
tion provided by him or her, as was argued
before. The expected contribution of the 
programme to local business priorities can
strongly support building trust in innovators,
because this enhances the expectation of 
beneficial effects and contributes to the idea
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of value-congruence between innovator and
local manager. The central risk of cooperating
with the innovator in an unprofitable pro-
gramme and being blamed and controlled as a
result is also curbed, and this also contributes
to trust in the innovator.
The reputation and the (informal) network
of the programme manager was another factor
in the effect of the promotional actions on 
the expectation of the effectiveness of the 
programme. The stronger the reputation of
running programmes that are profitable and
the stronger the network, the stronger the
trust in the innovator. When the number of
participating local organizations increases, the
network of the innovator also increases, etc.
This loop was called Reputation of the pro-
gramme manager as reinforcing factor
(Loop R1). R1 is a reinforcing loop that has a
positive effect on the growth of the participa-
tion. When the reputation of the innovator 
is damaged, this loop has a negative effect on
the participation of the local managers.
When the programme was successful with a
first group of participants, a new loop started.
Good results had a positive effect on trust in
the innovator by managers who have not yet
participated. Good results had a twofold effect
on trust in the innovator. On the one hand,
they signalled that the risk of investing in an
unprofitable programme and negative conse-
quences expected was small. On the other
hand, providing good results was seen as a
beneficial action of the innovator in a very rel-
evant area, which also promoted trust and the
willingness to cooperate with the innovator.
The programme sold itself. This loop was
called Results are the driving force of the pro-
gramme (Loop R2). R2 is also a reinforcing
loop: the driving forces accelerate. Here the
degree of the contribution of the programme
to the business priorities in local organizations
is important. A larger contribution means a
faster acceleration; a smaller contribution
means that the driving forces are weaker. In
practice, the results of programmes only show
after some time (see the clock in Figure 2).
These driving forces only have effects in the
long run. In some local organizations the
results may lag behind. Problems or gaps in
the programme only surface after the imple-
mentation has been taking place for some
time. If correcting actions are initiated by SLO
to solve these problems, the better the quality
of the central support, the less the decrease in
results. Since support is seen as a way to curb
the central risk of unprofitable actions, effec-
tive support in repairing programmes initiated
e-Innovation and trust dynamics 101
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by ‘them’will boost local managers’ trust in the
innovator. This loop was called Correction of
lagging implementation results (Loop B2).
When things go well we see a pattern com-
posed of these four loops (B1, R1 and R2, B2).
The map of this composed pattern is drawn in
Figure 2.
Promotional actions attract a first group of
participants who implement the programme.
First problems in the implementation create
corrective actions. Promotional actions com-
bined with attention of the Executive Board
and the reputation of the programme manager
attracts an increase in trust and participation.
After some time the positive results among the
first participants can create a self-propelling
effect: the programme sells itself.
However, the mental accounts of only a few
local managers are exhaustively represented
by Figure 2. These managers differed from the
others in experiencing a strong sense of
urgency regarding the issues raised by the
innovator and a high fit of the innovation with
their business priorities. To these managers a
programme had already sold itself before the
promotion. But too often this self-propelling
process did not occur. When the results of a
programme are not visible or subject to dis-
cussion, the effects of this loop are weak,
other loops outshine it. In the interviews,
many signals of strategic behaviour and repu-
tation management surfaced, that were
grouped into three sets of actions. These sets
of actions can be drawn in a new set of loops
that visualize the dynamics.
As soon as the first local managers start to
participate, others are informed through a
large informal network of peers in which they
exchange information about the effects of pro-
grammes. Local managers who consider par-
ticipation in a programme always verify the
formal information with their peers. Negative
stories and criticism of programmes flow 
especially easily in this peer network, and this
negatively influences the expectations of a
programme (Loop B5). Local managers felt a
strong urge to preserve their autonomy
towards headquarters.They tended to conceal
lagging results of implementation because
they feared external control. They kept nega-
tive signals within four walls and seldom com-
municated them in the formal channels in
order to avoid intensified control by head-
quarters. We call this ‘shielding’. Shielding
enforces window dressing as represented in
Loop B4.
Local managers and innovators both saw
negative reports as potential risks for their rep-
utation, and they kept them out of the formal
channels as much as they could. They tried to
manage their reputation within the company
by airing cooperative attitudes and intentions
and by window dressing within the formal
part of the field: negative signals were sup-
pressed and positive stories were sent into the
formal communication channels. The intervie-
wees pointed to the fact that many pro-
grammes had ambiguous objectives which
created room for plural interpretations and
this favours ‘positive storytelling’. As long as
the story is positive, there is no risk of repu-
tation loss. This loop is B3: Window dressing.
But here prior experiences played a role. The
local managers were familiar with the culture
and the strategic use of positive stories. This
activated their vigilant and distrustful search
for correct information. Any contrast between
the positive stories and criticism heard in their
peer network decreased their trust in the inno-
vator. The reputation of the innovator suffered
as a consequence, the effect of further 
promotional actions diminished and risk
awareness of potential participants increased.
Summary: the dynamics
Combining the loops together into one
drawing (see Figure 3) creates a complex map
which illustrates how the various elements
interact; some have a direct relation, others an
inverse relation, in some cases with a delay.
Understanding decreased
participation in 
innovation programmes
Having considered the trust-related dynamics,
the main characteristics of the field in which
Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, March–April 2005
these dynamics are embedded can be included
in the analysis to answer the question of how
decreasing patterns of participation can be
understood. Let us start with how participa-
tion in innovation programmes was originally
intended, that is: to cooperate with others in
a learning process in order to find profitable
new ways of handling the business. If this
intention is realized, the central risk of
unprofitable actions is optimally addressed
and the reputations of innovator and local
managers profit from positive results. So, par-
ticipation, reputation and profitability were
meant to be strongly and positively related in
support of innovation, which makes this char-
acteristic of the field potentially a most viable
one.The behavioural patterns found, however,
deviated strongly from the intended practices.
The finding that the field is laden with distrust
is central to explaining why this is the case.
Cooperation with others and mutual learning
need a certain level of mutual trust to flourish
and to produce results, a level that is not real-
ized within COOR. Based on prior relations
and past experiences, the field has become
divided into two parties whose relation is 
typified by them-and-us feelings, distrust and
accounts that border the paranoid (Kramer,
1996). The local managers experience the
power-dependence relation with headquarters
as unbalanced, because they get the blame
and suffer negative consequences if an 
innovation programme turns out to be un-
profitable in their business, an important
factor in growing distrust towards head-
quarters. Distrust promotes experiences of
value-incongruence (Sitkin and Stickel, 1996),
avoidance of interaction, unwillingness to
share seeing and liking (March and Olsen,
1975) and attribution of negative motives
(Kramer, 1996) that can be observed in this
case. The cycle of distrust that is set in motion
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reinforces the them-and-us feelings that divide
the field in two parties.
Furthermore, the strategies enacted at the
front stage, shielding and window dressing,
together with avoidance of interaction, mean
that the parties did not really meet each other,
they met in an ‘as-if’world in which parts were
played and strategic lines exchanged instead of
a real dialogue in which parties exchanged
their feelings, problems and insights. As a con-
sequence, parties did not receive correcting
information on their thinking, a factor that
supports further development of the cycle of
distrust, together with exchange of negative
valuations within the peer network. Participa-
tion in programmes became more and more a
matter of paying lip service and shallow invest-
ment of energy, which diminished the chances
of programme success, harmed the reputation
of innovation managers and reduced the par-
ticipation of local managers even further.
Once an organization is past the tipping point
from trustful to distrustful mental accounting
like COOR, distrust boosts a vicious cycle in
which valuable resources like willingness to
participate voluntarily become exhausted.
Consequences for 
innovator–actor interactions
To return to our starting point. Innovators aim
to cooperate with others in a learning process
in order to find profitable new ways of han-
dling the business. Innovators who use simple
or slightly more sophisticated models, like
Rogers and Block, run the risk of choosing
suboptimal actions towards actors in the field,
because these models do not take the dynamic
aspects of relations into account. Agreement
on innovations and trust are dynamic phe-
nomena. If we understand the factors that
influence these phenomena, the ‘why diagno-
sis’, insights will be gained to base more effec-
tive innovator actions on. A strategy for such a
diagnosis may be to pay attention to the
mental accounts of actors and the embedded-
ness of these accounts in the field context.
These accounts reflect prior experiences. In
the diagnosis the risk perception of actors and
their areas of relevance appear vital to under-
stand which actions of innovators promote
trust in innovators and the willingness to
cooperate with them. Innovators can also gain
valuable insights from a ‘who diagnosis’: who
are the actors in the field that can act as
‘tipping people’ whose participation (and
back stage behaviour) may create a switch
from distrustful to trustful accounting and
reverse the spiral processes?
These diagnostics issues have important
consequences for action. Innovators’ behav-
iours that are experienced as curbing — or at
least not enhancing — key risks that the local
actors envision will promote trust in innova-
tors. Innovators’ behaviours that are experi-
enced as promoting key risks will trigger
escalating spirals of distrust and a concentra-
tion of negative valuations of events, regard-
less of the positive intentions of the innovator.
We suggest that a successful innovator
first and foremost focuses on trust, i.e. on
the key risks of the actors and on under-
standing their areas of relevance.
It also seems important that the innovator is
very clear about his or her own risks and
understands what kind of actor actions will
curb his risks. If the innovator can create a
balance in mutual risk curbing, an important
condition for learning is created.
In extreme situations, like that described in
the case study, we expect that innovators’
actions that primarily express a clear respect
for the local managers’ areas of relevance will
be most productive. He or she may show con-
tinuously undivided attention to the actors in
the field, preferably at first on a one-to-one
basis. Given the history in this case, creating
psychological safety in collective meetings like
management conferences may prove vital.
One may invite the participants to express
their perceptions of risk and create an atmos-
phere of risk-sharing. This may open the road
towards cooperation based on a regular 
dialogue and sharing knowledge about 
similarities and differences in norms and
expectations. It would be productive to make
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very clear agreements, to monitor compliance
with agreements, deal actively with non-
compliance and agree beforehand on conflict
resolution. In a cross-cases comparative study,
these actions were found to be success factors
of organizational change and integration
processes (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2001). It is
crucial that this monitoring process is inter-
preted in a very different mode than the prac-
tice of one-sided control. In a study of trust in
managers, Bijlsma-Frankema and Van de Bunt
(2003) found that trust is promoted by moni-
toring, if monitoring is experienced as care
and is related to guidance to improve (indi-
vidual) performance, support in case of
trouble with others, openness to ideas of the
actors and cooperation-related problem
solving. A last recommendation that is stirred
by the case findings is that over time, main-
tenance of the relation is essential: the risk
perceptions and the areas of relevance are not
static entities and in that sense even a very
trustful relationship is never a permanent
promise of cooperation and innovation.
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